




ontrary to the overheated rhetoric of
certain conservative politicians, gov-
ernments were not placed on this
planet to waste money. Similarly, taxes are
not some burden of mythical proportions
which just appeared one day on the shoul-
ders of citizens, who have since laboured to
carry it. Rather, we pay taxes because we
collectively choose to pay taxes, in order to
finance the public provision of goods and,
mostly, services which citizens believe to be
useful and valuable. Over time, citizens
have explicitly empowered their govern-
ments with mandates to collect taxes pri-
marily in order to finance activities and
services which are deemed to be inade-
quately supplied by private economic agents
alone. This paper will consider the social
and economic consequences of government
taxing and spending activities, focusing par-
ticularly on the historic decline in that
activity which has occurred coincident with
the mid-1990s effort to reduce and elimi-
nate government deficits.
The focus is on the general level of fis-
cal activity, not on imbalances between the
taxing and spending sides of that activity.
Most analysts would agree that in the long
run the maintenance of some form of bal-
anced budget — or at least the attainment of
some measure of stability in public indebt-
edness — is a socially and economically ben-
eficial goal.1 A long-term secular rise in the
ratio of public indebtedness is obviously not
sustainable. So the issue is not whether budg-
et imbalances will be eliminated, but how. In
the Canadian experience of the mid-1990s,
budget deficits at the federal level and in vir-
tually every province were eliminated pri-
marily by reducing program expenditure.2
The decision to balance budgets in Canada,
therefore, was coincident with the decision
to significantly downsize government pro-
gram activity. It is the social and economic
consequences of this downsizing, not of the
balancing per se, that is the focus of this
paper. It is obviously conceivable that budg-
ets could have been brought into balance
without reducing program expenditures (by
raising taxes, by lowering interest rates
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finances), and so the decision to balance the
budget and the decision to downsize the pro-
gram activities of government should hardly
be treated as synonymous.
The forms of government fiscal activi-
ty are many and varied, of course. But for the
purposes of this paper, with its focus on the
economic and social consequences of govern-
ment taxation and spending, the following
four categories can be considered.
> Discretionary Counter-Cyclical Fiscal
Policy. Many government fiscal activ-
ities have inherent counter-cyclical
properties (so-called built-in stabiliz-
ers). At various times, discretionary fis-
cal policy has also been conducted to
attempt to smooth out, more pro-
actively, swings in private business
activity. This discretionary activity has
fallen out of favour, however, for vari-
ous reasons such as information uncer-
tainty and lags in the design and
implementation of policies. There may
be opportunity for careful experimen-
tation in the future with discretionary
counter-cyclical fiscal activities.3 For
now, however, explicit counter-cyclical
fiscal policy has largely been aban-
doned.
> Provision of Pure Public Goods.
Even neoclassical economic theory
admits a role for government fiscal
activity, in relatively rare cases of true
market failure. Some modern govern-
ment functions roughly fit the descrip-
tion of true public goods (perhaps
including policing and defence servic-
es), but most clearly do not. Most of
the services which government pro-
vides (including highly valued health
and education services) could clearly
be provided through private market
structures, since the utility of their
consumption can be “efficiently” trans-
ferred to the private purchaser of the
service, and that utility can be denied
to non-purchasers. The reason these
services are provided through public
channels is the widespread concern
regarding the distributional conse-
quences of private service provision
(buttressed, in some cases, by concern
over the administrative waste of private
insurance schemes). Very little of cur-
rent government activity can be justi-
fied using pure arguments regarding
public goods and market failure.
> Regulatory and Industrial Policy.
Canadian governments have tradi-
tionally invested considerable
resources in efforts to reshape the
structure and behaviour of the pri-
vate-sector economy through various
forms of regulation, subsidy and —
more rarely — outright public own-
ership of businesses. Again, this cat-
egory of government fiscal activity
has diminished significantly in recent
years, in the face of fiscal restraints
and concern about the efficiency of
some of these activities.4
> Redistribution of Cash and
Consumption. I would argue that most
modern government fiscal activity now
fits into the broad category of efforts to
redistribute both cash income and
access to final consumption (including
the consumption of non-cash public
services), in the interests of greater
equality, basic security and social inclu-
siveness. This is explicitly true for
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redistribute cash income on the basis of
concerns regarding equity and econom-
ic security for those (such as children,
the elderly and the unemployed) whose
market incomes may be inadequate to
meet basic income standards.5 This is
also clearly the case for the “big ticket”
social programs such as health care and
education. These services could be pro-
vided through private markets, but
public concern over the immense per-
sonal consequences for those who might
be unable to access those services
through a private market system has
led to public provision. In this case,
again, the motive is clearly redistribu-
tional in nature: to provide Canadians
(especially those of lower and moderate
incomes) with more health, education-
al and other “human” services than they
would be able to purchase through pri-
vate market transactions. Even more
mundane forms of government pro-
gram activity — such as garbage col-
lection, transportation infrastructure,
recreational facilities and environmen-
tal protection — are aimed at provid-
ing Canadians of modest means with
more of these particular forms of con-
sumption than they would typically be
able to access through private market
transactions alone.
This redistributive motive for govern-
ment fiscal activity carries various broader
economic effects. For example, public provi-
sion of education may result in a better-edu-
cated population than would be possible with
private education systems; alternatively, some
of these programs (and/or the tax systems
which are constructed to pay for them) may
have non-discretionary (or “automatic”)
counter-cyclical effects. But the primary goal
is one of redistribution and improved access:
to provide lower- and middle-income
Canadians with more of certain types of con-
sumption than they would otherwise be able
to afford, and to reassure better-off Canadians
that they will receive those programs should
their personal economic circumstances take
a turn for the worse. The degree to which
this general goal is fulfilled by government
fiscal activity is likely to have suffered, there-
fore, with the overall reduction in govern-
ment taxing and spending activities which
occurred in the 1990s.
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF TAXING AND 
SPENDING
Consumption of Public Services
The direct provision of public services
consumed a total of $205 billion in 1998,
equal to just under one quarter of GDP.6 On
average, then, each household in Canada
received some $16,320 worth of publicly
provided non-cash services (defined here sim-
ply as the value of all non-transfer public pro-
gram spending). The distribution of public
service consumption across income brackets
is difficult to estimate; no data on this sub-
ject are available.7 Some types of public serv-
ices are targeted at lower-income Canadians
(such as social services); other are used most
intensively by higher-income Canadians
(such as universities); many services would
seem to be equally consumed by all
Canadians, regardless of income (such as
recreational or cultural facilities). In the
analysis that follows, we will adopt the sim-
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income bracket consumes a roughly equal
proportion of non-cash public services. To the
extent that public services are consumed dis-
proportionately by lower-income households,
this assumption will understate the extent of
redistribution that is occurring through gov-
ernment fiscal activity; the reverse is true if
public services are accessed more intensively
by higher-income Canadians.
Table 1 indicates that even an equal
per capita consumption of public services
still contributes disproportionately to the
final consumption possibilities of lower- and
middle-income Canadians. For the lowest
quintile of Canadian households, their con-
sumption of non-cash public services more
than doubles their total household con-
sumption possibilities (relative to the pri-
vate consumption possibilities provided by
their total disposable cash income, includ-
ing government transfers). Even for the
middle quintile of Canadians, their share of
non-cash public services is equivalent to 50
percent of their total private (cash) con-
sumption possibilities.
The obvious objection, of course, is
that not all government consumption actu-
ally contributes to the quality of life of
Canadian households. This is certainly the
case — but it is also true of private con-
sumption spending. Not all private con-
sumption spending is useful; much is
wasted (because of poor quality, incomplete
information or inefficient pricing). The
unique aspect of public or collective con-
sumption is that it presupposes some kind
of collective choice mechanism, and hence
each individual does not have full control
over the public consumption decisions
which affect him or her; yet private con-
sumption decisions are similarly constrained
by the structure of individual decision-mak-
ing power (such that access to benefits or
efficiencies which might arise from collec-
tive forms of consumption are not available
in a purely individualized consumption
framework). So long as normal democratic
processes are at work to ensure that a larger
share of government spending is dedicated
to concretely useful services, and a smaller
share to boondoggles, it seems reasonable to
conclude that citizens will collectively
ensure that they get value for their money
in non-cash public services, just as they con-
tinually strive to get value for their money
in their personal cash spending. Moreover,
to the extent that some services (such as
health care) may be provided more effi-
ciently through public delivery systems
than private ones, then this analysis under-
states the improvement in living standards
that results from the consumption of pub-
lic non-cash services (since it would take an
even larger amount of private cash purchas-
es to attain the same consumption of serv-




Public Consumption Per Household, 1998
Non-cash public services delivery per household:
$16,320
Quintile Average Government
Household Consumption as %
Disposable Income Disposable Income
Lowest $10,017  163
Second $21,960  74
Third $33,374  49
Fourth $48,778  33
Highest $85,606  19
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada, 
Income in Canada, Canadian Economic Observer.
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The Redistribution of Income
and Consumption
The most explicitly redistributive
aspect of government fiscal activity is the
system of personal taxes and transfer pay-
ments to individuals. Canada’s personal
income tax system is highly progressive; in
1997 (the most recent year for which final
income tax data are available), almost 60
percent of total income taxes were paid by
the highest-income 10 percent of the popu-
lation, while the lowest-income 60 percent
of Canadians paid only 10 percent of all
income taxes.8 Other direct taxes in Canada
are less progressive, or even regressive, in
their burden. Meanwhile, transfer payments
to households are also distributed on a pro-
gressive basis (due to the lower average
incomes of the recipients of many transfer
programs, such as Employment Insurance
and the Guaranteed Income Supplement,
and due also to the means-testing features of
many transfer programs). The lowest-income
quintile receives 50 percent more transfer
income per household than the highest-
income quintile — and that transfer income
constitutes a much larger share of total
household income for lower-income house-
holds (equalling two thirds of total income
for the lowest quintile, versus less than 4
percent of total income for the highest quin-
tile). The combined effect is a significant
redistribution of cash income down the
income ladder. As indicated in Table 2, the
net effect of direct taxes and transfers
increases the disposable cash income of the
lowest quintile of Canadians by some $6,000
per household (nearly tripling their pre-tax
“market” income). On the other hand, it
reduces the disposable income of the high-
est quintile of households by $23,500 per
household, or about 20 percent.
The Economic and Social Consequences of
Fiscal Retrenchment in Canada in the 1990s
TABLE 2
Taxes and Transfers Per Household, 1998
Transfers Taxes Net Cash
As Share As Share Effect of
Market Government Total Direct Total Taxes &
Quintile Income Transfers Income Taxes Income Transfers
Lowest $3,993  $6,696  63%  $671  6%  +$6,025
Second $16,211 $8,367  34%  $2,619  11%  +$5,748
Third $32,979 $6,801 17% $6,406 16% +$397
Fourth $55,417 $5,176 9% $11,815 19% -$6,639
Highest $109,116 $4,258 4% $27,768 24% -$23,510
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cash public services, this tax-and-transfer
system results in a very significant net
redistribution of both cash income and final
consumption possibilities. Chart 1 indicates
that the top quintile received pre-tax or
“market” income equal to some 27 times
the pre-tax income of the lowest quintile.
This inequality of pre-tax income has
grown significantly over the past two
decades. After taxes and transfers, however,
the ratio of inequality falls to 8.5 to 1. This
ratio of disposable income inequality stayed
more or less constant, despite rising mar-
ket inequality, until 1995, when it began
to rise moderately. And when the per capi-
ta value of non-cash public services is added
to the equation, the ratio of inequality in
final consumption possibilities falls to less
than 4-to-1. Total government fiscal activ-
ity, therefore — considering both cash
taxes and transfers, and the provision of
non-cash public services — has the com-
bined effect of reducing this particular
measure of inequality in Canadian society
by about 85 percent.
Table 3 indicates that the bottom two
quintiles of households receive, on average,
more cash back from government in the form
of transfers than they pay to government in
income taxes, payroll deductions and con-
sumption taxes.9 In this immediate sense,
government “pays off” for the lower-income
40 percent of society. Even for the middle
(third) and upper-middle (fourth) quintiles,
once the value of non-cash public services is
considered, households on average still get
more back from government than they pay
in income taxes, payroll deductions and con-
sumption taxes (on the continued assump-
tion, of course, that these households
continue to view those non-cash government
services as useful). Only the highest quintile
of society pays more in income taxes, payroll
deductions and consumption taxes than it
receives back from government fiscal activity,
making a net contribution of some $20,000
per household.10
Even if the approximate tax costs per
household were grossed up to reflect the bur-
den of other taxes not considered here (such




Tax and Benefit Balance Sheet, 1998
Estimated Net Cash Non-Cash Net
Direct Consumption Cash Gain Public Gain
Quintile Taxes 1 Taxes2 Transfers or Loss Services or Loss
Lowest $671 $1,503 $6,696 +$4,522 $16,320 +$20,842
Second $2,619 $3,294 $8,367 +$2,454 $16,320 +$18,774
Third $6,406 $5,006 $6,801 -$4,611 $16,320 +$11,709
Fourth $11,815 $7,317 $5,176 -$13,956 $16,320 +$2,364
Highest $27,768 $12,841 $4,258 -$36,351 $16,320 -$20,031
1 Direct taxes include income taxes and social insurance payroll deductions.
2 Estimated as 15 percent (the average combined federal and provincial sales tax rate in Canada) of after-tax-and-
transfer disposable income; actual consumption taxes are lower for households, such as higher-income households,
which save more of their disposable income.
Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada, Income in Canada, Canadian Economic Observer.
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net beneficiaries of the taxing and spending
activities of government, while the upper-
middle quintile of Canadians roughly “break
even.” This result reflects the highly pro-
gressive nature of the Canadian income tax
system, and the targeted nature of many cash
transfer programs.
THE RETRENCHMENT OF TAXING
AND SPENDING
Coincident with the effort to reduce
government deficits at all levels during the
mid-1990s, the program activity of Canadian
governments experienced a historically
unique reduction beginning in the mid-
1990s. Ironically, this shrinkage in the rela-
tive and even absolute size of government
program spending continued through the
end of the decade, even after the attainment
of fiscal balance and the generation of large
surpluses. This immediately suggests that to
some degree the downsizing of government
programs was motivated by something other
than solely concern with government deficits.
Since 1992, program spending by all
levels of government in Canada (on a nation-
al accounts basis) has fallen by approximate-
ly one fifth, measured as a share of GDP —
from an all-time peak of 43 percent of GDP
in 1992 to 34 percent in 1999 (see Chart 2).
The program spending share has fallen fur-
ther since then. At the federal level alone,
program spending has fallen somewhat more
sharply, by about one quarter — from a peak
of 17.9 percent of GDP in 1992 to some
13.5 percent of GDP in 1999. In either case
this represents by far the most significant
rollback of real government program activity
in Canada since the end of the huge military
effort in World War II.
The retrenchment in program activity
was experienced broadly at the federal, provin-
cial and municipal levels of government (see
Chart 3). Some “other” government sector
agencies, such as pension plans and hospital
boards, maintained their program spending as
a share of GDP. As a proportion of GDP, the
provincial level of government experienced the
largest reduction in program activity, shrink-
ing by almost 5 points of GDP during this
period. Local governments reduced their pro-
gram activity by close to 2 points of GDP.
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to some extent in the event of a future eco-
nomic downturn (reflecting both contraction
in the GDP denominator and normal cycli-
cal increases in certain types of spending), it
is unlikely that this would offset much of the
one fifth decline in the program spending
share which has been observed since 1992.
For example, employment insurance
benefits are perhaps the most directly count-
er-cyclical form of government transfer pay-
ment (rising automatically in the event of a
downturn, falling when unemployment
abates with economic recovery). Regular EI
benefits have fallen by more than 50 percent
since peaking in 1993; in real per capita
terms, they have fallen even further. This
retrenchment in one of Canada’s most
expensive social programs has been an
important source of the federal government’s
fiscal improvement (accounting for over 1
full point of the decline in program spend-
ing as a share of GDP since 1992, or one
quarter of the federal government’s bottom-
line fiscal improvement during that time).
Clearly the reduction in unemployment (by
some 450,000 persons between 1993 and
1999) has been important in that decline.
But even more important have been deep
structural changes in the EI system itself,
which have reduced eligibility and benefit
levels. For example, real EI benefit payments
were 40 percent lower in 1999 than in 1990
(mostly due to the declining coverage of the
program, and only slightly due to declining
real benefits for those who are covered) —
even though the number of total unem-
ployed was roughly equal in the two years.
Chart 4 illustrates the stark decline in the
level of real EI benefits paid out per unem-
ployed person in Canada (a rough indicator
Jim Stanford
The total government sector and most
components within it have experienced bal-
anced budgets (on a national accounts basis)
since 1997. This has meant that the worst of
the program spending retrenchment which
was experienced in the mid-1990s is now
over. Nevertheless, the decline in program
spending activity by Canadian governments,
relative to the size of the overall economy,
shows no sign of easing. Indeed, the federal
government has explicitly pledged that its pro-
gram spending will continue to decline as a
share of GDP in the coming years.11 At the
federal level (despite campaign promises to
the contrary) the clear majority of discre-
tionary funds will be allocated to tax cuts,
rather than enhancements in program activ-
ity;12 this will ultimately reinforce the
decline in the importance of program spend-
ing. There is no indication, in summary, that
the declining trend in the total government
program spending share has stopped, even
though deficits have apparently been van-
quished and the public debt burden (meas-
ured appropriately as a share of GDP) is
declining rapidly.13
Some of the reduction in program
spending (measured in both relative and
absolute terms) is obviously attributable to
the strong expansion in Canada’s economy in
the last couple of years. Broader economic
growth has the effect of expanding GDP (the
denominator of the program spending share)
and reducing some cyclically sensitive pro-
gram expenditures (such as transfer payments
to unemployed persons). However, the cycli-
cal component to the observed decline in the
importance of program spending should not
be overemphasized. Clearly a deep structur-
al shift in the role of government programs
in Canadian society has occurred. While the
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gram) since 1990, to levels not seen since
well before the path-breaking UI reforms of
1971. Even in the event of a serious reces-
sion, therefore, the increase in program
spending by this most cyclically sensitive of
government programs will be modest by
historical experience. Increasing unemploy-
ment by 50 percent (as occurred, for exam-
ple, during the 1991-92 recession) and
holding real average benefit levels constant
would result in an increase in EI-related pro-
gram spending of less than one half percent
of GDP — offsetting barely one twentieth
of the decline in the program spending share
that has been observed at all levels of gov-
ernment since 1992. The trend indicated in
Chart 2, therefore, can only be interpreted
as primarily structural in nature.14
Regarding the direct provision of non-
cash public services (rather than transfer
payments), some analysts have argued that
this provision has not declined to the same
extent as real program budgets, due to down-
ward flexibility in the effective real “costs” of
those services (measured in terms of public
expenditure per unit of real service deliv-
ery).15 Consider Canada’s education system,
for example, which has digested significant
budget reductions during the 1990s: total
public education spending per enrolled stu-
dent, in real terms, declined by 5.7 percent
between 1994 and 1997, and probably more
since then.16 About 40 percent of this decline
in public spending was offset by a 16 percent
increase in private fees and other revenues,
but bottom-line budgets for educational
institutions in Canada still shrank by 3.4
percent in real per student terms. A good
portion of that funding decline has been
reflected in declining real wages for teachers
and other educational workers. For example,
the average real weekly earnings of teachers
and others employed in elementary and sec-
ondary schools declined by over 13 percent
between 1993 and 2000.17 At the same time,
the ratio of elementary and secondary stu-
dents per full-time teacher employed in the
industry (which might be considered as a
broad measure of average classroom sizes)
hardly changed at all. This would imply that
teachers and other education workers have
“absorbed” much of the decline in public
funding in the form of lower real incomes,
thus insulating the level of real service pro-
vision — for a while, anyway. Some caution
must be taken, however, before concluding
that real public service provision has not been
harmed by the funding cutbacks. In the first
place, the sharp decline in real incomes for
teachers and other public service workers has
generated immediate losses among those
workers, their families and their communi-
ties. Secondly, the decline in real incomes for
those workers will certainly have a major
impact on the quality of the work which they
are performing; eventually, declining real
incomes will make it increasingly difficult
for schools to attract and retain qualified
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work effort of those teachers who remain
employed.18 In this manner, the decline in
financial support for education and other
public services will ultimately be reflected in
a deterioration in the quantity and quality of
public service delivery, on top of their more
immediate impact on the real incomes of
public service providers.
The retrenchment of public sector
fiscal activity in Canada is significantly
altering this country’s standing in inter-
national comparisons of this subject.
Program spending at the federal level is
now significantly smaller, relative to GDP,
than is the case in the United States,
although lower-level program spending in
Canada is still twice as great proportion-
ately as in the US (reflecting both the rel-
atively decentralized nature of government
in Canada and the greater importance here
of public services such as health care which
are provided in Canada by lower levels of
government). As recently as 1995, Canada
ranked in the middle of all OECD coun-
tries in terms of program spending as a
share of GDP; now we rank among the
lower third of countries by this measure,
with a program spending ratio significant-
ly lower than the OECD average.
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF 
PROGRAM RETRENCHMENT
Within another two or three years, pro-
gram spending by government in Canada
will likely have reached its lowest level (as a
share of GDP) in three decades. Not since the
1960s will Canada have experienced such a
low level of government fiscal activity, rela-
tive to the size and growth of the overall
economy. Since it was in the 1960s and
1970s that welfare-oriented interventionism
reached its peak in Canada, and we developed
an international reputation as a “just socie-
ty,” the long-run social implications of this
unprecedented rollback in government fiscal
activity are likely to be significant.
Many data on key social indicators are
published with a lag of two or more years,
and the effects of government spending
reductions on those indicators will generally
not be felt for some time. As a result, the
impact of the mid-1990s fiscal retrenchment
on social variables is only just becoming vis-
ible. At the same time, the strong economic
and labour performance that Canada has
enjoyed since 1998 is helping to offset some
of the negative social consequences of that
retrenchment. Nevertheless, there are some
worrisome signs of deteriorating underlying
social conditions in Canada that will need to
be monitored carefully in coming years.
Transfer payments to individuals have
declined moderately in real terms since 1994,
as summarized in Table 4. Canadian house-
holds, on average, lost some $400 per year (in
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ing about 1 percent of their disposable
income. This decline was felt most strongly
among the bottom two quintiles of the
income ladder, both of whom lost some 4
percent of their real 1998 disposable income
to transfer payment reductions over the pre-
vious four years.
During the same period, Canada expe-
rienced the first notable increase in the
inequality of after-tax disposable income in
recent decades — despite the positive dis-
tributional effects resulting from the
strengthening of labour markets. As noted
above, the tax-and-transfer system has tradi-
tionally offset much of the growing inequal-
ity that has been visible in pre-tax,
pre-transfer “market” incomes. In 1995,
however, inequality started to grow marked-
ly, even in disposable income terms (see
Chart 5). The disposable income ratio
between the top quintile and the bottom
quintile increased by about 20 percent
between 1995 and 1998 — almost as much
as the corresponding 23 percent increase in
the ratio of pre-tax-and-transfer market
incomes between the same two quintiles. In
other words, with the downsizing of gov-
ernment transfer programs in the mid-
1990s, followed by the implementation of
growing income tax cuts (the largest of
which are not yet reflected in this income
distribution data), it seems that Canada’s
tax-and-transfer system is failing to play its
traditional role of offsetting the growing
inequality of private market incomes.19 One
quarter of the increase in the inequality of
disposable incomes between the top and bot-
tom quintiles in recent years is attributable
to the absolute decline in real transfer pay-
ments to the poorest families. Most of the
rest is attributable to the failure of those real
transfer incomes to keep up with the increase
in average real market incomes (or, in other
words, attributable to the relative erosion of
the importance of transfer payments). For
those who have argued that the reduction of
transfer payments to poor Canadians will
somehow encourage them to go out and earn
more in the private “market,” recent data are
cold comfort: the real pre-tax market
incomes of the bottom quintile actually
declined by some 10 percent between 1995
151
The Economic and Social Consequences of







































































Decline in Transfer Income Per Household,
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Source: Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada, 
Income in Canada.
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ket), amplifying the decline in transfer
income received by these same households.
But the importance of government to
the distribution and quality of economic
opportunity is not limited to the tax-and-
transfer system. As described above, the
provision of direct, non-cash public services
is also an important component of the over-
all standard of living of most Canadians. If
anything, this activity has declined even
more dramatically in the wake of the pro-
gram spending cutbacks by all levels of gov-
ernment. Chart 6 illustrates the decline
since 1992 in the real per capita provision
of public services in Canada. Since peaking
in 1992 at close to $7,000 (in 1992 dollars)
per capita, the average consumption of pub-
lic services has declined by 8 percent. At the
same time, private consumption spending
has increased (in real per capita terms) by
14 percent. This implies that public con-
sumption has declined even more rapidly in
relative terms — that is, as a share of the
total bundle of consumption opportunities.
Indeed, Chart 6 indicates the declining
trend in per capita public consumption as a
proportion of per capita private consump-
tion. This ratio peaked in 1982 at close to
48 percent of private consumption; in other
words, the total consumption basket at that
time was allocated two-thirds to private
consumption and one third to public con-
sumption. This indicates that public serv-
ice delivery reached its zenith at the end of
the 1970s in terms of its relative impor-
tance. The ratio gradually declined over the
next 15 years, reflecting the gradual erosion
of the importance of government, and has
contracted precipitously since 1995 to its
lowest level since the 1960s. In terms of the
relative importance of public consumption,
then, Canada is already a “leaner, meaner”
and more privatized society than at any
time in the past three decades — and the
recent election promises of politicians at
both the federal and provincial levels sug-
gest that this trend will be accentuated in
the coming years.
The erosion of public service con-
sumption in Canada during the 1990s has
been described here using relatively abstract
composite indicators, such as program spend-
ing budgets as a share of GDP and public
consumption as a share of total consumption.
The historic decline in these aggregate meas-
ures, obviously, does not directly illustrate
the more concrete manifestations of hardship
and dislocation which have been associated
with the retrenchment of government fiscal
activity. The goal of public programs, obvi-
ously, is to concretely improve living condi-
tions — not to boost the program spending
share for its own sake. The task of docu-
menting the deterioration of living standards
in Canada associated with the shrinkage in
public programs is necessarily undertaken
through detailed, sector-specific investiga-
tions. Examples of studies which document
this deterioration follow.
> Bezanson and McMurray (2000) docu-
ment the longer-run effect of provin-
cial welfare cutbacks on individual
families in Ontario.
> The Ontario Health Coalition (2000)
documents the growth of user fees and
other private health costs during the
1990s in Ontario. 
> Raphael (1999) finds linkages between
growing income inequality and the
deterioration of health outcomes
among poor Canadians. 
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documents the decline in the quality of
post-secondary education in Canada in
the 1990s according to indicators such
as faculty turnover and student-facul-
ty ratios. 
> Zelder and Wilson (2000) find a 51
percent increase in average waiting
times for important medical treatments
in Canada between 1993 and 1999. 
> Osberg and Sharpe (1998) describe a
sustained decline in economic well-
being in Canada through the 1990s,
largely attributable to rising economic
insecurity among Canadians. 
> Brown and Stanford (2000) provide
similar evidence of a decline in eco-
nomic well-being in Canada between
1990 and 1999, driven exclusively by
a decline in social insurance and pub-
lic consumption.
While each of these investigations typ-
ically describes only a small, specific slice of
the overall erosion of public consumption
and economic security in Canada, they col-
lectively paint a picture of real decline in
public services, and a corresponding erosion
of economic security and well-being experi-
enced in many segments of Canadian socie-
ty. At the same time, however, other studies
report continued public confidence in and
support for the quality of important public
services such as health care and education,
and public opinion polls consistently suggest
that Canadians view public financial support
for these programs as representing the high-
est priority for future fiscal allocations.20
Despite the apparent decline in the quality
and effectiveness of many public programs,
therefore, Canadians still express a strong
view that they generally represent a worth-
while use of expendable public funds. The
pressure to repair and rebuild many damaged
programs, and to initiate new programs to
address emerging social and economic needs
(such as early childhood education or home
care), is likely to persist, despite the current
bias of Canadian federal and provincial gov-
ernments in favour of tax cuts.
WAS THERE A CHOICE?
Supporters of the retrenchment in pub-
lic expenditures which dominated Canada’s
fiscal landscape during the 1990s argue that
the spending reductions were necessary in
order to address chronic fiscal weakness and
an accumulation of public debt which most
analysts agree was unsustainable. The fact
that program spending is still declining in
relative terms, despite the vast improvement
in the bottom-line fortunes of Canadian gov-
ernments, inspires some scepticism regard-
ing the claim that the retrenchment was
motivated solely by fiscal necessity. And,
indeed, the post-hoc evidence suggests that
deficits could indeed have been eliminated
without nearly the damage to the program
spending activities of Canadian governments.
At the federal level, for example,
Finance Minister Paul Martin famously set
out a deficit-reduction timetable in his 1995
budget that he pledged to meet “come hell
or high water.” This timetable would see the
federal public accounts deficit shrink from
the nearly 5 percent of GDP booked in fis-
cal 1994 to 3 percent in fiscal 1996, 2 per-
cent in fiscal 1997 and 1 percent in fiscal
1998. The budget could presumably then be
balanced in fiscal 1999 (although this final
step was not spelled out explicitly in the
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timetable represented an ambitious but not
unreasonable pace of deficit reduction, espe-
cially in the context of global economic
recovery.21 In reality, however, the federal
government implemented what was clearly
a much more dramatic plan for reducing and
eliminating the deficit. The government’s
spending and tax decisions reflected a more
rapid internal timetable for elimination of
the deficit, but this more aggressive stance
was “hidden” in official budget documents
through measures such as deliberately pes-
simistic macroeconomic assumptions and the
allocation of large “contingency” funds. In
practice, the federal government outper-
formed its own deficit reduction timetable
by two full years — reducing the deficit to
just 1 percent of GDP in fiscal 1996 and
then attaining a balanced budget a year
later. This made Canada’s federal govern-
ment the first in the G7 to balance its budg-
et — even though Canada’s fiscal situation
had ranked among the worst in the OECD
just a few years earlier.
Was this dramatic and accelerated pace
of deficit reduction necessary? Clearly there
are some benefits from eliminating deficits
sooner rather than later — a smaller accu-
mulation of debt, and lower interest charges
arising from that debt, chief among them.
Yet the social and economic consequences of
deficit reduction through program spending
cuts are obviously heightened when that
reduction occurs at such an accelerated pace.
Indeed, it turns out that the initial 3-2-1
timetable so famously laid out by Mr. Martin
could have been achieved without any nominal
program spending reductions at all. Table 5 sum-
marizes two deficit reduction scenarios: the
actual experience of the federal government
since 1994 (top portion), and a counterfactu-
al scenario which assumes the federal gov-
ernment had only frozen nominal program
spending at its 1994 levels, rather than
implementing the deep spending cuts that
began with the 1995 budget. The counter-
factual scenario also assumes that Canada’s
nominal GDP growth during the period of
spending cutbacks would have been
strengthened by the amount of the spending
cutback.22 On the basis of other plausible
assumptions (regarding average effective tax
rates and average effective interest rates,
which are assumed constant in the two sce-
narios), the federal government would still
have outperformed its supposed “official”
deficit reduction timetable, and balanced the
budget by fiscal 1999 — with no cuts in
nominal program spending and no addition-
al increases in aggregate taxation (other than
those which were in fact imposed by the fed-
eral government).23
In this context, the claim that the
only alternatives to deep program spending
cuts would have been either the continuing
indefinite accumulation of public debt or
the imposition of dramatic tax increases is
not credible. The fact that so many other
countries also eliminated deficits during the
latter 1990s, most of them more gradually
than Canada and most without dramatic
reductions in program expenditure, simi-
larly supports the notion that real choices
were available while still accepting the gen-
eral goal of deficit reduction. And the deci-
sion by Canadian governments to impose
dramatic program spending reductions to
attain a uniquely fast improvement in bot-
tom-line fiscal balances must therefore
reflect priorities other than simply the
desire to balance the budget.
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Analysts of virtually all political stripes
agree that fiscal balance is something that
governments should strive to maintain. But
the maintenance of fiscal balance, and deep
reductions in the absolute and relative
importance of government fiscal activity, are
two different and distinct concepts. For var-
ious reasons, Canadian governments in the
mid-1990s elected to attain virtually all of
its deficit reduction through deep reductions
in program spending — and hence placed
the burden of that reduction onto the backs
of the lower- and middle-income Canadians
for whom that program spending (in the
forms of both cash transfers and non-cash
public services) is most important. It is now
four years since balanced budgets were
attained in Canada, yet the historic decline
in program spending shows no sign of revers-
ing itself. Taxes are now declining as a share
of GDP, and that decline will accelerate in
the wake of the tax-cut promises of current
governments. As taxes decline, “catching up”
to the earlier decline in program spending,
the current downsized state of government
programs will become cemented.
Continued government downsizing
long after the attainment of balanced budgets
suggests that factors other than deficit reduc-
tion were a motivating force for the historic
retrenchment in the fiscal role of government
that has been experienced in Canada. Most
developed economies attained reduced gov-
ernment deficits over the past decade.
However, the program spending reductions
in Canada were uniquely deep; only three
other OECD countries experienced a simi-
larly large shrinkage in the relative impor-
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TABLE 5
Actual and Simulated Deficit Reduction, 1994–99
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Official Deficit Target -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0
(% GDP)
Actual Experience
Nominal GDP Growth (%) 5.6 3.1 4.3 3.2 7.6
Revenue ($b) 123.3 130.3 140.9 153.2 155.7 160.0
Program Spending ($b) 118.7 112.0 104.8 108.8 111.4 115.5
Debt Service ($b) 42.0 46.9 45.0 40.9 41.4 41.5
Balance (% GDP) -4.8 -3.5 -1.1 0.4 0.3 0.3
Counterfactual Simulation
Nominal GDP Growth (%) 6.5 4.0 4.3 3.2 7.6
Revenue ($b) 123.3 131.4 143.3 155.8 158.3 162.7
Program Spending ($b) 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7 118.7
Debt Service ($b) 42.0 47.1 45.9 42.5 43.6 44.1
Balance (% GDP) -4.8 -4.2 -2.5 -0.6 -0.4 0.0
Note: Counterfactual simulation assumes identical revenue/GDP ratio and average effective interest rate as in actual
experience; program spending is frozen at 1994 nominal level; GDP growth adjusted by the amount of the foregone
program spending cutbacks in 1995 and 1996; and debt accumulation and debt service charges adjusted accordingly.
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ing the 1990s, even though several experi-
enced budget deficits that were equally large
if not larger.
High-income Canadians pay more into
government than they get back, they clearly
would like to keep more of their pre-tax
income (who wouldn’t?) and they constitute
a disproportionately important political
influence. Businesses would prefer to see
lower income and payroll taxes, and they also
carry disproportionate political weight.
Employers would prefer to deal with a labour
force which is relatively less “entitled,” in
terms of the security and consumption
opportunities which are provided through
the state (rather than through private
employment income). Legitimate public con-
cern over unsustainable government deficits
in the 1990s provided these constituencies
with the opportunity to effect a structural
change in Canadian society that goes far, far
beyond simply balancing the government’s
books. It involves an unprecedented and last-
ing retrenchment in the overall role of gov-
ernment programs in the social and economic
lives of Canadians. For those who enjoy high
pre-tax market incomes, this restructuring
may enhance their long-term prospects
(although even they may experience some
insecurity as a result of the erosion of social
entitlements). But for most Canadians, who
still get more back from government than
they pay into it, the incidence of poverty,
inequality and insecurity will almost cer-
tainly increase.
As government programs are cut back,
and taxes eventually decline to keep up, then
Canada will look increasingly like the lop-
sided 27-to-1 society that is already visible
in the data on the distribution of market
incomes. The provision of both cash income
supplements and non-cash public services is
becoming markedly less important, in both
absolute and relative terms. For the bottom
and middle quintiles of the distribution lad-
der, this will inevitably translate into a
reduction in long-term consumption possi-
bilities. Canadian society will demonstrate
more private consumption, less public con-
sumption, great and growing inequality, and
in the long run probably a decline in
observed performance on a range of health
and social indicators.
NOTES
1 For a left-wing vision that accepts the need for
some form of “balanced budgets,” see the various
editions of the Alternative Federal Budget project,
which has been produced annually since 1995 by
the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and
CHO!CES.
2 In his paper in this volume, Don Drummond
estimates that over 75 percent of the discre-
tionary fiscal change at the federal level between
1993 and 1997 took the form of program spend-
ing cutbacks. Similarly, in a previous paper,
Stanford (2000) estimates that program spend-
ing cutbacks constituted 64 percent of the total
improvement in the federal budget balance
between 1994 and 1998. This estimate incorpo-
rates the fiscal savings resulting from lower inter-
est rates (while Drummond considers only the
effects of what he calls “discretionary” fiscal meas-
ures, not including interest rate changes); if inter-
est savings are excluded from the Stanford
analysis, then spending cutbacks similarly
account for more than 75 percent of fiscal
improvement over the same period. At the
provincial level, the fiscal balance (on a national
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points of GDP between 1992 and the attainment
of balanced aggregate provincial budgets in
1997. More than 100 percent of this improve-
ment (4.3 points of GDP) was attributable to
reduced program spending (which was partly off-
set at the bottom line by rising debt service pay-
ments and falling provincial transfer revenue
from the federal level).
3 For example, the NDP proposed in the most
recent federal election a kind of infrastructure sav-
ings account, into which funds are invested dur-
ing years of fiscal surplus and an inventory of plans
is maintained for various infrastructure construc-
tion projects. When the economy slows, it is both
fiscally and operationally possible for government
to quickly organize counter-cyclical infrastructure
construction activity in an efficient manner.
4 For example, total government subsidies to busi-
ness in Canada have fallen by 60 percent since
1980 as a share of GDP, to just 1.1 percent in
1999. Similarly, the intensity of government reg-
ulation would seem to have been reduced (or at
least streamlined) in recent years; a recent inter-
national study, for example, listed Canada as hav-
ing the least burdensome regulations on business
start-ups in the world (see Dixon, 2000).
5 In 1999, transfer payments to individuals by all
levels of government totalled $106 billion,
accounting for about one third of total govern-
ment program spending.
6 The year 1998 is chosen for this analysis to be
consistent with the quintile household income
distribution data utilized below; all public
expenditure data are reported on a national
accounts basis.
7 Irwin Gillespie conducted a landmark study to
estimate the distributional impact of public
spending in the 1960s and 1970s; see Gillespie
(1966, 1978). He found, similarly, that public
services are not consumed disproportionately by
lower-income categories, consistent with the sim-
plifying assumption used here of equal per capi-
ta consumption of public services. Gillespie’s
studies would be worth repeating in the wake of
the sea change in fiscal policy which has occurred
in Canada since the publication of his work.
8 Author’s calculations from Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency (1997).
9 The analysis does not include other taxes, such as
corporate taxes and property taxes, and hence
understates the total cost of taxation and over-
states the net benefits of government. Personal
income taxes, social insurance payments and con-
sumption taxes account for over two thirds of all
government revenues. Consumption taxes are
estimated as 15 percent (the weighted average
combined federal and provincial sales tax rate in
Canada) of disposable income for each quintile.
10 Jonathan Chevreau, the tax-bashing columnist for
the National Post, once bemoaned this state of
affairs as “the ruthless arithmetic of democracy”
(Chevreau, 1999). Michael Walker, Executive
Director of the Fraser Institute, agreed that most
Canadians (those with annual incomes up to
$50,000 per year) get more out of government
than they pay in, and held that this would limit
efforts to reduce the size of government —
because of continuing popular support for the
redistributive function that government plays
(see Walker 1999). In retrospect, Walker under-
estimated the ability of the top quintile to exer-
cise disproportionate influence on Canada’s
political process; his pessimism was not fully jus-
tified (although continued support for govern-
ment taxing and spending activities will limit
the extent to which fiscal activity continues to
shrink).
11 Finance Minister Paul Martin, in delivering
his “Economic Statement and Budget Update”
in October 2000, said: “Over the next five
years, we will hold the rate of growth in pro-
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in the economy.”
12 See Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
(2000) for an analysis of the allocation of latent
federal surpluses to the competing goals of pro-
gram enhancement, tax cuts and debt reduction.
Defining a “neutral” fiscal policy as one in which
taxes are constant as a share of GDP and program
spending per capita is held constant in real terms
(Don Drummond utilizes a similar definition in
his paper in this volume), the analysis finds that
just 2 percent of available federal funds over the
1997-2001 period have been allocated to
enhancements in program spending (and that
includes the monies allocated under the
September 2000 health accord between the fed-
eral and provincial governments).
13 The net federal government debt, in public
accounts terms, declined from a peak of 71 per-
cent in 1995 to an estimated 55 percent by the
end of the current fiscal year. In national accounts
terms (the reporting method used by most other
industrialized countries), the net debt is some 15
percentage points lower (as a share of GDP), and
falling faster. See Department of Finance Canada
(2000), Table 3.1 and Annex 2.
14 In his paper in this volume, Don Drummond sim-
ilarly estimates that 87 percent of the improve-
ment in the federal fiscal balance between 1993
and 1997 resulted from discretionary policy
changes, not from economic recovery.
15 The author is grateful to Jeremy Rudin for sug-
gesting this line of argument.
16 Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada
(2000b).
17 Author’s calculations from Statistics Canada
(2000b).
18 Most Canadians seem to accept that the quality
of public services will be correlated with the
morale and working conditions of public service
providers; see, for example, Ontario Secondary
School Teachers’ Federation (2000), which
reports the results of a public opinion poll regard-
ing the likely effects on education quality of the
intensification of work demands on teachers. For
an overview of the negative trends in teacher
recruitment and retention in Canada, see
Canadian Teachers’ Federation (2000b).
19 For more detail and analysis of these trends, see
the paper by Andrew Heisz, Andrew Jackson and
Garnett Picot in this volume.
20 Despite evidence of the deteriorating quality of
public health care, most Canadians view the pub-
lic system as effective and valuable; see Rachlis,
Evans, Barer and Lewis (2001). Support for the
system is higher among those who have used it.
Similarly, public opinions regarding public edu-
cation are more positive (in terms both of desir-
ing more public support and approving of the
quality of public education) among those with
children enrolled in public schools; see Canadian
Teachers’ Federation (2000a). Public opinion
polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 by EKOS
Research Associates, Ipsos-Reid and the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation all indicated signifi-
cantly more support for public spending on edu-
cation, health care and other public services than
for tax cuts.
21 Steadily improving fiscal balances were experi-
enced very broadly among industrialized
economies during the latter 1990s, whether or
not they undertook to significantly reduce pro-
gram expenditures.
22 In other words, it is assumed that each dollar of
reduced program spending translated into a
reduced dollar of GDP; no additional spin-off
“multiplier effects” are assumed. This view is
consistent with the estimates of analysts during
1995 and 1996 that government spending cuts,
especially at the federal level, caused a significant
fiscal “drag” effect which reduced Canadian GDP
growth by as much as 1.0 percentage points in
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Lester (1996).
23 The successive Alternative Federal Budgets pro-
duced by the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives and CHO!CES in 1996 and 1997
accepted the official deficit reduction timetable
outlined in 1995 by Mr. Martin, but attained
those targets without program spending cuts
(and without increasing the aggregate ratio of
federal taxes to GDP). Of course, freezing the
nominal program budget would still have
implied a gradual erosion in the real per capita
value of federal programs. Even simply by freez-
ing nominal program spending at its 1994 level,
federal program spending would still have
declined by 1.8 points of GDP between 1994 and
1997 — smaller than the actual 3-point decline
which occurred in this period but significant
nonetheless.
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